Most companies have a risk register. It's a spreadsheet with risks listed, likelihoods scored, impacts rated,, controls mapped. It looks like risk management. It isn't. It's risk documentation. The difference matters because regulators — and attackers — don't care what's in your spreadsheet. They care what's in your technology.
Risk management under NIS2 isn't "have a risk register." It's implement risk management measures. That word — implement — is where most companies stop and most breaches start.
Implemented means the risk is actually reduced by a control that works, not just listed in a document. A risk that says "data breach — likelihood: low, impact: high, mitigation: encryption" is not risk management. It's a row in a spreadsheet. Risk management is: encryption is implemented, key management is configured, the encryption has been tested, and someone can prove it.
Here's what happens in practice. A company does a risk assessment. The assessment identifies 30 risks. Controls are mapped to each risk. The risk register is updated. The ISO 27001 auditor reviews it. Everyone is satisfied.
But when you ask "show me that the control works," the answer is a policy document. When you ask "when was the control last tested," the answer is "during the audit." When you ask "what would happen if the control failed," the answer is silence.
That's the evidence gap. The control exists on paper. There's no evidence it works in practice. And that's what NIS2, DORA, and increasingly ISO 27001 auditors are starting to look for.
A risk register without evidence is a wish list. Each row says "we mitigate this risk with this control." Without evidence that the control works, it's a hope, not a mitigation.
Evidence-based means each risk in your register has corresponding proof that the control actually reduces it. Not "we have access controls" but:
A control on paper says "we monitor for suspicious activity." Control implementation means there's a SIEM with detection rules that actually detect suspicious activity, and someone has tested those rules against real attack patterns to confirm they'd fire.
Here's the gap between documented controls and implemented controls for common ISO 27001 Annex A examples:
NIS2 requires "risk management measures" — not "a risk management document." When regulators examine your compliance, they want to see that risks are managed, not just identified. Specifically:
The regulator's question isn't "do you have a risk register?" It's "can you show me that your controls reduce the risks you identified?" If the answer is "here's our policy," that's not evidence.
DORA goes further. It wants operational resilience demonstrated through testing. Not a recovery plan that says "we can restore in 4 hours." Evidence that you tested restoration and it took 4 hours. Not a threat detection policy. Evidence that detection was tested and caught the simulated attack.
DORA makes the evidence gap explicit: if you can't prove the control works, you can't claim resilience. And "prove" means test results, not policy documents.
If you have controls documented but no evidence they work:
The deliverable isn't a better risk register. It's a risk register with evidence attached. Each risk has a control, each control has proof. That's what regulators want. That's what stops breaches.
Get in touch. We can help map your controls to technical verification.
Get in touchAethel Guard is a Netherlands-based security architecture firm serving EU companies of all sizes. We design and analyse security architecture for projects and products. Your architect, not your vendor.